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SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Clifford J. Hynning*
N A TECHNICAL SEiNSE, the source of law governing any particular
proceeding, whether arising before a judicial or an adminis-
trative authority, must be found within the legal system under
which the court or the authority functions. For any national court,
the legal system is necessarily the municipal law of the country
of the forum which, for the purposes of the American lawyer,
would mean the law of the United States and of its political sub-
divisions. In that connection, it may be noted that international
law, whether of the public or private variety, is a part of the
municipal law of the United States.1 The federal constitution
makes this explicitly so in the case of public international law,2
while it is universally agreed that private international law, in
those cases where there is a possibility of a conflict of laws, also
forms part of the municipal law of each country. The rights con-
cerned or the property involved in any given proceeding may also
be directly affected by provisions of municipal statutes or by
earlier judicial determinations in the form of case law, but this
article is concerned with the "sources" of international law in
* J. D., LL. ,M., CRICAGo-KENT COLLEGE OF L.&W; former attorney, United States
Treasury Department; member of the Illinois, District of Columbia, and the
United States Supreme Court bars.
1 Kent, Commentaries, 12th Ed., pp. 1-2, states: "When the United States ceased
to be a part of the British Empire, and assumed the character of an independent
nation, they became subject to that system of rules which reason, morality, and
custom had established among civilized nations of Europe, as their public law."
2 But see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 at 316-8,
57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L. Ed. 255 at 261 (1936), where the court said: "As a result of
the separation from Great Britain of the colonies, acting as a unit, the powers
of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but
to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States
of America. Even before the Declaration, the colonies were a unit in foreign
affairs, acting through a common agency-namely the Continental Congress,
composed of delegates from the thirteen colonies. That agency exercised the
powers of war and peace, raised an army, created a navy, and finally adopted the
Declaration .of Independence . . . . It results that the investment of the Federal
Government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the
affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to
conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other
sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have
vested in the Federal Government as necessary concomitants of nationality."
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
the broader sense, that is with respect to the point as to where
the rules included in the laws of nations originate and where they
conveniently may be found.
A crisp summary of the entire topic is presented in Article 38
of the Statute under which the International Court of Justice
presently operates. That article states that the court, whose func-
tion it is to decide in accordance with international law such dis-
putes as are submitted to it, is to apply:
1. International conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;
2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
3. The general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
4. Subject to the provisions of article 59,3 judicial decisions
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determina-
tion of rules of law.
But the enumeration so made was also said not to prejudice the
power of the Court to decide a case "ex aequo et bono," if the
parties agreed thereto.
This formal enumeration of the sources of international law
is not dissimilar from various statements made by leading Amer-
ican jurists in characterizing the nature of international law
under the federal constitution. One of the most frequently quoted
statements has been that made by Chief Justice Marshall in the
case entitled Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle.5 He there
declared:
The law of nations is the great source from which we derive
those rules, respecting belligerent and neutral rights, which
3 Article 59 of the Statute provides that the decision of the Court has "no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case."
4 Finch, The Sources of Modern International Law (Carnegie Endowment, wash-
ington, 1937).
5 13 U. S. (9 Cranch) 191, 3 L. Ed. 701 (1815).
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are recognized by all civilized and commercial states through-
out Europe and America. This law is in part unwritten, and
in part conventional. To ascertain that which is unwritten,
we resort to the great principles of reason and justice; but,
as these principles will be differently understood by different
nations under different circumstances, we consider them as
being, in some degree, fixed and rendered stable by a series
of judicial decisions. The decisions of the courts of every
country, so far as they are founded upon a law common to
every country, will be received, not as authority, but with
respect. The decisions of the courts of every country show
how the law of nations, in the given case, is understood in
that country, and will be considered in adopting the rule
which is to prevail in this.'
Justice Story made a similar enumeration, while sitting as a
circuit judge, in the course of his opinion in the case of United
States v. La JeuneT wherein he said:
Now the law of nations may be deduced, first, from the general
principles of right and justice, applied to the concerns of
individuals, and thence to the relations and duties of nations;
or, secondly, in things indifferent or questionable, from the
customary observances and recognitions of civilized nations;
or, lastly, from the conventional or positive law, that regu-
lates the intercourse between states. What, therefore, the
law of nations is, does not rest upon mere theory, but may
be considered as modified by practice, or ascertained by the
treaties of nations at different periods. It does not follow,
therefore, that because a principle cannot be found settled by
the consent or practice of nations at one time, it is to be con-
cluded, that at no subsequent period the principle can be
considered as incorporated into the public code of nations.'
6 13 U. S. (9 Cranch) 191 at 198, 3 L. Ed. 701 at 703.
7 Mason's Reports 409; 26 Fed. Cas. 832, Case No. 15,51 (1822).
8 26 Fed. Cases 832 at 846.
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Approaching the subject at hand from a slightly different
standpoint, it might be worth while to arrange the sources so noted
under the headings of (1) custom, (2) treaties, (3) case decisions,
(4) juristic opinions, and (5) general principles, and then to dis-
cuss each in detail.
1. CUSTOM
The older opinions on international law, particularly before
the coming of the many treaties that characterize the modern
relations of states, stressed with great frequency, and at great
length, the customary nature of international law. In its origins,
the law of nations was never far removed from the "law of
nature," as is so clearly shown in the writings of the European
publicists that were so frequently quoted by Marshall, Story and
Kent.9 The requirements for a custom were frequently implicit.
But custom is never fully equated with usage; it is, more nearly,
"usage developed into a rule which is adhered to in the belief
that an obligation so to act exists."10 Kopelmanas once concluded
that there would be two factors in the formation of custom: (1) a
material fact-the repetition of similar acts by states; and (2) a
psychological element-usually called the opinion juris sive neces-
sitatis-the feeling on the part of the states that in acting as they
act they are fulfilling a legal obligation.1
9 A modern appraisal of the "law of nature" may be found in United States-
Mexico General Claims Commission, 1926, Opinions of the Commissioners (The
Dredging Company Case), wherein the arbitral tribunal said: "The laws of nature
may have been helpful, some three centuries ago, to build up a new law of nations,
and the conception of inalienable rights of men and nations may have exercised a
salutary influence, some one hundred and fifty years ago, on the development of
modern democracy on both sides of the ocean; but they have failed as a durable
foundation of either municipal or international law and cannot be used in the
present day as substitutes for positive municipal law, on the one hand, and for
positive international law, as recognized by nations and governments through
their acts and statements, on the other hand." The quotation appears in
Schwarzenberger, International Law (Stevens & Sons, Ltd., London, 1949), 2d Ed.,
Vol. 1, p. 14.
1o Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 6th Eng. Ed., (1929), p. 10. Westlake,
International Law (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1910), 2d Ed., Vol. 1,
p. 14, points out that custom "must not be confounded with mere frequency or
even habit of conduct .... In other words, custom is that line of conduct which
the society has consented to regard as obligatory."
11 Kopelmanas, "Custom as a Means of the Creation of International Law,"
The British Yearbook of International Law (1937), p. 127, particularly p. 129.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
These two elements are best amplified by an extended but
much quoted description of the growth and function of custom
provided in a modern casebook on international law. The author
thereof, after noting that usage means no more than habitual
practice, goes on to state:
The growth of usage and its development into custom may
be likened to the formation of a path across a common. At
first, each wayfarer pursues his own course; gradually, by
reason either of its directness or on some other ground of
apparent utility, some particular route is followed by the
majority; this route next assumes the character of a track,
discernible but not yet well defined, from which deviation,
however, becomes more rare; whilst in its final stage the
route assumes the shape of a well-defined path, habitually
followed by all who pass that way. And yet it would be diffi-
cult to point out at what precise moment this route acquired
the character of an acknowledged path. 2
After pointing out that the growth of usage and formation of
custom, both as between a community of individuals and the
community of nations, proceeds much on the same lines, he con-
tinues:
As between nations, some particular practice or course of
conduct arises, attributable in the first instance to some
particular emergency or prompted by a common belief in its
convenience or safety. But its observance is discretionary;
and it exists side by side with other competing practices.
Next, as between competing usages, the fittest, having regard
to the needs of the time, generally tends to prevail. It
gathers strength by observance. It comes to be recorded, and
is appealed to in cases of dispute, although not infrequently
violated. Finally, it comes to command a general assent; and
at this stage it may be said to take on the character of a
custom, which involves not merely a habit of action, but a
rule of conduct resting on general approval.3
12Cobbett, Cases on International Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1947), Vol.
1, p. 5.
13 Cobbett, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
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Despite this, the author, aware of the fact that the conditions of
international life are constantly changing, so that new conditions
tend to generate new usages which may, in their turn, develop
into customs that could modify or supersede those hitherto
observed, resolves the possibility of conflict between customs by
indicating that within each political society and as between indi-
vidual members of the community
the difficulty of ascertaining custom is met by the gradual
establishment of some form of political authority which,
through its various organs, assumes at once to declare what
customs are binding and also to enforce them on its individual
members. Out of this grows the national law. The two great
difficulties with respect to custom are (1) the difficulty of
proof, and (2) the difficulty of determining at what stage
custom can be said to become authoritative.1
4
The obligatory nature of customary international law, once
the custom has been determined to exist, has been stressed by the
United States Supreme Court through the medium of its opinion
in the case entitled The Scotia.5 Speaking through Justice Strong,
the court declared:
Undoubtedly, no single nation can change the law of the sea.
That law is of universal obligation, and no statute of one or
two nations can create obligations for the world. Like all the
laws of nations, it rests upon the common consent of civilized
communities. It is of force, not because it was prescribed by
any superior power, but because it has been generally accepted
as a rule of conduct. Whatever may have been its origin,
whether in the usages of navigation or in the ordinances of
maritime states, or in both, it has become the law of the sea
only by the concurrent sanction of those nations who may
be said to constitute the commercial world. . . . When, there-
fore, we find such rules of navigation . . . accepted as obliga-
tory rules by more than thirty of the principal commercial
14 Ibid., p. 6.
1581 U. S. (14 Wall.) 170, 20 L. Ed. 827 (1871).
121
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states of the world, including almost all which have any
shipping on the Atlantic Ocean, we are constrained to regard
them as in part at least, and so far as relates to these vessels,
the laws of the sea, and as having been the law at the time
when the collision of which the libellants complain took place.
This is not giving to the statutes of any nation extra-terri-
torial effect. It is not treating them as general maritime laws,
but it is recognition of the historical fact that by common
consent of mankind, these rules have been acquiesced in as of
general obligation.16
Nevertheless, in recent times, it has become more difficult to
establish a rule of international law on the basis of custom, as
can be seen in recent cases coming before the International Court
of Justice or determined by its predecessor, the Permanent Court
of International Justice.
In the Lotus Case,17 for example, the French Government
failed to make an "international custom" out of the fact there
had been an abstentation by states from instituting criminal pro-
ceedings in relation to collision cases occurring at sea, the court
noting that only if it could be said such abstentation was based
on the idea that the states had been "conscious of having a duty
to abstain" would it be possible to speak of an international
custom.'" Similarly, in the 1950 decision in the Colombian-
Peruvian Asylum Case,9 the International Court of Justice gave
further indication of the difficulties of establishing conventional
international law, saying:
Finally the Colombian Government has referred to a large
number of particular cases in which diplomatic asylum was
in fact granted and respected. But it has not shown that the
1681 U. S. (14 Wall.) 170 at 187, 20 L. Ed. 827 at 836.
17 S. S. Lotus (France v. Turkey, 1927), Hudson, World Court Reports, Vol. 2,
p. 20. Note that the American member of the Court, Judge John Bassett Moore,
dissented on other grounds. But see The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677, 20 S.
Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320 (1900), where the United States Supreme Court found, by
reference to "ancient usage," that coastal fishing vessels were exempt from capture
as prize of war.
18 Hudson, op. cit.. Vol. 2, p. 20 at p. 42.
19 ICJ Reports 1950, 266; Am. Jour. Int. Law, Vol. 45, 179 and 781 (1951).
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alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualification was
invoked-or if in some cases it was in fact invoked-that it
was, apart from conventional stipulation, exercised by the
States granting asylum as a right appertaining to them and
not merely from the reasons of political expediency. The
facts brought to the knowledge of the Court disclose so much
uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and dis-
crepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and, in the
official views expressed on various occasions, there has been
so much inconsistency in the rapid succession of conventions
on asylum, ratified by some States and rejected by others,
and the practice has been so much influenced by considera-
tions of political expediency in the various cases, that it is
not possible to discern in all this any constant and uniform
usage, accepted as law, with regard to the alleged rule of
unilateral and definitive qualification of the offence.20
One could not well leave this aspect of the subject without
making one further quotation. Judge Manley 0. Hudson, in a
paper prepared for the International Law Commission in 1950,
made some observations on customary international law. He indi-
cated that the emergence of a principle or rule of customary
international law would seem to require the presence of the
following elements:
(a) concordant practice by a number of States with refer-
ence to a type of situation falling within the domain of
international relations;
(b) continuation or repetition of the practice over a consid-
erable period of time;
(c) conception that the practice is required by, or consistent
with, prevailing international law; and
(d) general acquiescence in the practice by other States.2
20 ICJ Reports 1950, 266 at p. 277. See also Hackworth, Digest of International
Law (General Printing Office, Washington, 1940), Vol. 1, p. 15. The author
there states that It is "sometimes difficult to determine whether the practice of
states in a given respect has been of sufficient duration and uniformity to result
in the development of a rule of international law."
21 UN Doc. A/CN. 4/16 (3 March, 1950), p. 5.
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He added, of course, that the presence of each of these elements
would have to be established by a competent international au-
thority.
The work involved in showing the satisfaction of these tests
would clearly not be an easy task to undertake and will tend to
become more difficult with the further passage of time. It could
be said, therefore, that the reign of customary international law
is definitely on the wane and the reason for this is to be found
in the tremendous growth of conventional international law. This
very growth of conventional law, however, has opened a new door
for a significant role of customary law, one in relation to the
process of the interpretation of treaties.
2. TREATIES
A treaty, regardless of its name, establishes a rule of law
intended to govern the particular relations of the states signatory
to the treaty. Where the number of signatory states is large and
the document is comprehensive in scope as, for example, the peace
treaties following the Napoleonic Wars or resulting from World
Wars I and I, the treaty has occasionally been designated as
"law-making. ' 22 To the extent that this purported distinction
between "law-making" treaties and others implies that the other
treaties are not "law" for the parties signatory, it may not be
wholly satisfactory" for international tribunals, whose decisions
are admittedly "binding" only as between the parties to the pro-
ceeding, have obviously recognized that any treaty involved in a
dispute before the tribunal operates as law with respect to that
22 Brierly, Law of Nations (Oxford University Press, New York, 1942), 3d Ed.,
p. 47, has defined "law-making" treaties as "those which a large number of states
have concluded for the purpose either of declaring their understanding of what
the law is on a particular subject, or of laying down a new general rule of law
for future conduct, or of creating some international institution." Oppenheim-
Lauterpacht, International Law (Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1947), 7th
Ed., p. 26, supplements this by adding that usually "such treaties only are regarded
as a source of international law as stipulate new general rules for future inter-
national conduct or confirm, define, or abolish existing customary or conventional
rules of a general character."
23 See, in that connection, the criticism of Briggs, The Law of Nations (Appleton-
Century-Crofts Co., New York, 1952), 2d Ed., pp. 45-6.
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dispute.2 4 The distinction may, nevertheless, still remain a useful
one, for a consideration of the general applicability of a treaty
may be a factor in appraising the treaty's significance in inter-
national law.
Even a bi-partite treaty may frequently assume a greater
significance than might otherwise have been the case. This is
particularly true where the terms thereof have become general-
ized through acceptance and imitation by other states and, to this
extent, such treaties may become important evidence of a develop-
ing international custom. Examples of this trend may readily
be found in the various commercial treaties embodying the "most-
favored-nation" clause and, perhaps more clearly, in the series
of extradition treaties with their varying definitions of offenses.
Paramount among the "law-making" treaties, of course, are
those associated with the coming of peace after the great wars,
with the holding of the great conferences at The Hague, Geneva,
and Paris, and with the constructive work of the League of
Nations and the United Nations. They cover such matters as the
constitutional framework of the International Court of Justice
and of its predecessors, the International Monetary Fund, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the
various other international institutions or arrangements for par-
241Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice (Macmillan, New
York, 1943), pp. 608-9. Writing well before the great growth of international
treaties of this century, Sir Frederick Pollock, "The Sources of International Law,"
2 Col. L. Rev. 511 (1902), declared: "Treaties and conventions between particular
states may define any portion of those rules, or add to or vary the existing rules,
but any conventional rule so laid down is binding only on the parties to it. Acts
of this kind may go to show, according to the nature of the case and the particular
circumstances, the existence of a general usage which the parties wished to record
for convenience in apt words and in authentic form (though this is not common),
or the dissatisfaction of the parties with existing usage and their desire to
improve on it, or the absence of any settled usage at all antecedent to the par-
ticular agreement. It is, therefore, impracticable, with one exception to be
mentioned, to make any general statement as to the value of treaties and similar
instruments as evidence of the law of nations. The exceptional case, which is of
increasing frequency and importance, is where an agreement or declaration is
made not by two or three states as a matter of private business between themselves,
but by a considerable proportion, in number and power, of civilized states at large,
for the regulation of matters of general and permanent interest . . . There is
no doubt that, when all or most of the great Powers have deliberately agreed to
certain rules of general application, the rules approved by them have very great
weight in practice even among states which have never expressly consented to
them . . . As among men, so among nations, the opinions and usage of the leading
members in a community tend to form an authoritative example for the whole."
125
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ticular purposes, as in the field of transportation and communica-
tion.25
Any analysis of the decisions of international tribunals on
particular treaties must be undertaken with considerable care in
the special light of the precise treaty provisions. Specific language
or particular concepts contained within the treaties could well
directly condition the judicial result which, for these reasons,
may not be comparable, except superficially on the facts, with the
judicial result attained in other controversies involving particular
treaties of possibly varying terminology. It may be trite to stress
the necessity for an examination of the procedural manner in
which the controversy arose and the particular treaty framework
applicable to it, but a failure to do this may lead to erroneous
conclusions, especially where bi-partite treaties are involved.
3. CASE DECISIONS
A rapidly growing body of case law possessing international
implications has been developed by various international tribunals
and agencies. In the first place, and during the past century or
so, there have been the great arbitral awards of the ad hoc tri-
bunals, as in the Alabama Claims (1872), the Behring Sea dispute
(1893), and the Pious Fund Case (1902). It is, of course, im-
portant to note the specific terms of reference under which these
arbitrations were made, or under which other arbitrations might
be conducted, for these terms, as is the case with treaties, might
serve to condition the result in a very specific manner, particularly
in relation to whether or not the case was, or is to be, decided
on the basis of ex aequo et bono rather than under the rules of
internal law.26 A most impressive body of case law has also been
built up by the International Court of Justice and by its prede-
25 McNair, "The Function and Differing Legal Character of Treaties," The British
Yearbook of International Law (1930), pp. 100-18. More extended treatment of this
point appears in a paper by the author, entitled "Treaty Law for the Private
Practitioner," in 23 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 36-75 (1955).
26 Moore, Digest of International Law (General Printing Office, Washington,
1906), Vol. 1, pp. xxxix-xl.
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cessors,27 but the reporting thereof has been far from satisfactory.
In 1952, Edvard Hambro, the then Registrar of the Court, pri-
vately issued, in digest form, a compilation of excerpts from the
decisions of the court classified by principal topics 2 which effec-
tively shows the sweeping range of interests involved in proceed-
ings before these international tribunals.
In a sense, the case decisions of international tribunals, when
not narrowly circumscribed by treaty provisions and procedural
limitations, may be the most important single source of inter-
national law, not even yielding to the "law-making" treaties for
the full meaning of the latter may require implementation in the
form of a decision of an international tribunal. Nor does their
importance yield to the decisions of national tribunals for an
international decision is often impressively fortified by that im-
partiality of interest that is so fundamental to the concept of
justice.2 9 In that connection, an eminent authority in the field of
international law once said:
Awards of international tribunals such as courts of arbitra-
tion possessed of a neutral umpire (if not of entire neutral
membership) afford impressive evidence of the requirements
of international law. The impartiality and learning and acu-
men of the neutral members of such bodies have oftentimes
been productive of decisions entitled to the respect of States
generally. The awards of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
at The Hague have afforded conspicuous examples. The judg-
27 In general, see Lauterpacht, Development of International Law by the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice (Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1934), and
Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts (Stevens
& Sons, Ltd., London, 1945).
28 It Is unfortunate that 'Hambro, in The Case Law of the International Court
(Sijthoff, Leyden, 1952), p. vii, chose to exclude the "separate opinions of one or
more judges ... whether these be in the form of dissenting or individual opinions."
He assigned, as a reason, that however notable they may have been and however
great the learning and wisdom of the Judge in question, such statements do not
represent the views of the Court." A common-law lawyer would add, however, that
this would be true "only at the time of the actual decision," for he would be familiar
with the frequency with which dissenting or concurring opinions, in time, often
become "the views of the Court." Contrast Hambro's views with those expressed
by Moore In the preface to his Digest.
29 An exception to the statement In the text should be noted where a national
tribunal decides a close question against the immediate national interest of the state
of the forum, or where a national law officer decides to yield to a foreign claimant.
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ments and advisory opinions of the Permanent Court of
International Justice bear testimony of the highest order as
to what the law of nations really is.30
But, important as these holdings may be, the lawyer is not confined
thereto.
In large measure, the leading body of international law of
particular interest in the United States is to be found, more
nearly, in the decisions of the federal Supreme Court, the lower
federal courts, and the holdings of various British courts.3' Deci-
sions of national tribunals on international problems have occa-
sionally been cited by international tribunals when dealing with
similar problems, as was true in the Chorzow case (1926) and
the Norwegian claims case (1922), which may be suggestive of
a developing international common law.32 The contributions of
Chief Justice Marshall, of Justices Story and Gray, and of
Chancellor Kent have been particularly notable, as some of the
earlier quotations herein have indicated. A unique body of law
was also developed quite early by the British prize courts,33 at
least in relation to maritime warfare. There is, of course, always
the doubt that a national tribunal may not be impartial in deciding
30 Hyde, International Law (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1947), Vol. 1, pp. 13-4.
31 Lauterpacbt, "Decisions of Municipal Courts as a Source of International Law,"
The British Yearbook of International Law (1929), p. 65 et seq., notes that "quite
apart from judgments of prize courts, there is hardly a branch of international law
which has not received judicial treatment at the hands of municipal tribunals . . .
They are the chief source of judicial authority on the nature, the conditions, and the
effects of recognition of states, governments, and belligerency as well as on ques-
tions of state succession and succession of governments, not only in regard to
private rights in their different aspects, but also on such matters of succession in
obligations laid down in treaties."
32 Cardozo, J., in New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U. S. 361 at 383, 54 S. Ct. 407,
78 L. Ed. 847 at 858 (1934), mentioned the fact that international law has, "at
times, like the common law, . . . a twilight existence during which it is hardly
distinguishable from morality or justice, until at length the imprimatur of a court
attests its jural quality."
33 Hyde, International Law (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1947), Vol. 1, p. 13,
states: "The decisions of the prize courts of a belligerent are often-times com-
mended as entitled to great respect because of the function of such tribunals to
determine, according to the requirements of international law, the propriety of acts
of capture and other incidents thereto. It has been found, however, that even when
not restrained by the influence of local statutory or other regulations the natural
prejudices of the most enlightened and scrupulous tribunal established under
belligerent authority tend to weaken its impartiality and to diminish foreign respect
for its conclusions."
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the conflicting interests of foreign and domestic nationals but
evidence of bias is not frequently found present, hence national
court holdings deserve attention.
4. OPINION'S OF JURISTS
The opinions of jurists and scholars, as distinguished from
the opinions of judges sitting on tribunals, have been accorded
varying weight as a source of international law. In earlier times
in the United States, when case precedents were largely lacking
and treaty law was in its primitive stage, great weight was given
by American judges to the opinions of Grotius, Vattel and others.
In particular, Justice Story and Chancellor Kent made great use
of the writings of these foreign jurists in their commentaries and
also in their opinions. Even as late as 1900, the United States
Supreme Court gave considerable weight to juristic opinion when
it decided the case of the Paquete Habana and the Lola,34 as is
shown in the following quotation taken from that case, to-wit:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by
years of labor, research and experience, have made them-
selves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which
they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals,
not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the
law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the
law really is.35
34 175 U. S. 677, 20 S. Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320 (1900).
35 175 U. S. 677 at 700, 20 S. Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320 at 328-9. But see the opinion
in the case of The Adula, 176 U. S. 361, 20 S. Ct. 432, 44 L. Ed. 505 (1900), where
the same court said that the opinions of foreign writers could not be accepted as,
in any particular, overruling.
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The British courts, by contrast, operating with a singular
degree of insularity, have been inclined to attach much less weight
to the opinions of jurists. Somewhat contemporaneously with the
Habana case, the King's Bench Division, in the case of West Rand
Central Gold Mining Company, Ltd. v. The King," pointed out
that
any doctrine so invoked must be one really accepted as bind-
ing between nations, and the international law sought to be
applied must, like anything else, be proved by satisfactory
evidence, which must. show either that the particular propo-
sition put forward has been recognized and acted upon by our
own country, or that it is of such a nature, and has been so
widely and generally accepted, that it can hardly be supposed
that any civilized state would repudiate it. The mere opinions
of jurists, however eminent or learned, that it ought to be so
recognized, are not in themselves sufficient. They must have
received the express sanction of international agreement, or
gradually have grown to be part of international law by their
frequent practical recognition in dealings between various
nations . . . [E]xpressions used by Lord Mansfield, when
dealing with the particular and recognized rule of interna-
tional law on this subject, that the law of nations forms part
of the law of England, ought not to be construed so as to
include as part of the law of England opinions of textwriters
upon a question as to which there is no evidence that Great
Britain has ever assented, and a fortiori if they are contrary
to the principles of her laws as declared by her courts.37
International tribunals, however, probably because they reflect the
greater influence of continental law in the composition of their
membership, tend to make substantial use of juristic opinion, in
much the same manner as a continental law court would.
36 [1905] 2 K. B. 391.
37 Ibid., at pp. 407-8.
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5. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
In the formative period of the growth of international law,
it must not have been easy to distinguish between custom and
"general principles of law," at least from the terminological
standpoint. The case-by-case method of growth, so characteristic
of the common law, was applied to international law, both in the
form of deductions drawn from general principles of accepted
international law and in the form of analogies from other private
systems of law with which the judges were familiar.38 An illumi-
nating statement of this technique of growth is to be found in one
of Arbitrator Nielsen's opinions in the course of which he said:
International law, as well as domestic law, may not contain,
and generally does not contain, express rules decisive of
particular cases; but the function of jurisprudence is to
resolve the conflict of opposing rights and interests by apply-
ing, in default of any specific provision of law, the corollaries
of general principles, and so to find-exactly as in the
mathematical sciences-the solution of the problem. This is
the method of jurisprudence; it is the method by which the
law has been gradually evolved in every country resulting in
the definition and settlement of legal relations as well be-
tween States as between private individuals.3 9
The formal recognition of "general principles of law" as a
''supplementary" source of international law, to be applied by
the International Court of Justice pursuant to Article 38 of the
Statute, has been called by Professor [now Judge] Lauterpacht
to be the "outstanding and, to a certain extent, revolutionary
38 In the S. S. Lotus Case, Permanent Court of International Justice Reports
(SiJthoff, Leyden), Series A, No. 10, pp. 16-7, the court said: "Now the Court con-
siders that the words 'principles of international law,' as ordinarily used, can only
mean international law as it is applied between all nations belonging to the com-
munity of States ... In these circumstances, It is Impossible-except in pursuance
of a definite stipulation-to construe the expression 'principles of international law'
otherwise than as meaning the principles which are in force between all independent
nations and which therefore apply equally to all the contracting Parties."
39 See the opinion In Great Britain (Eastern Extension, Australasia & China
Telegraph Company claim) v. United States, United States-Great Britain Claims
Arbitration, Nielsen's Reports (1926), p. 73.
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contribution made by the Statute to international law as a
whole."" The Statute of the Court makes it most explicit that
the "general principles" there referred to are clearly distinguish-
able from the considerations ex aequo et bono which may be
resorted to only with the express consent of all parties to the
dispute. Lauterpacht, undertaking a systematic exploration of
the meaning of the phrase, after pointing to the fact it was not
identical with decisions ex aequo et bono, which were dealt with
separately, indicated that there were three sources from which
an answer could be drawn. In his opinion, the answer might be
sought first in a
study of international arbitration before the establishment
of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Such an
investigation . . . shows that whenever international tri-
bunals have recourse to "general principles of law" they
apply, as a rule, a general principle of private law, i. e., a
principle not belonging to the system of law prevalent in one
country, but expressing a rule of uniform application in all
or in the main systems of private jurisprudence.
He continued by saying the query could be answered, in the second
instance, on the ground of a simple logical inference drawn from
the context of Article 38. In that connection, he stated:
The Statute refers here to such general principles of law as
are neither international law proper nor considerations ex
aequo et bono. This means that although the Court may
apply, for the purpose of a particular case, a rule of criminal
or administrative law of sufficient generality, it is of general
rules of private law that, on the whole, we must needs think
in this connection. For it is, as a rule, private law which
gives shape and definite form to those general sources. Here
40 See his Private Law Sources and Analogies in International Law (Longmans,
Green & Co., New York, 1927), p. viii. The wording of the Statute was proposed by
Elihu Root after considerable discussion among the members of the committee of
jurists: Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists,
Proces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee (July 24, 1920), pp. 331 and
344.
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lies the organising and ordering part played by it. Those
''general principles" threaten otherwise to degenerate into
altogether subjective natural law or legal philosophy.
With respect to the third source, he noted that
the utterances of jurists drafting the Statute do not fail to
throw some light on the meaning of the clause in question.
Thus the Chairman of the Committee, from whom the sub-
stance of the clause originated, explained its meaning by
reference to the principle of res iudicata adopted by the tri-
bunal in the Pious Fund case; and another member suggested,
while referring to that case, that this was a rule which had
the same character of law as any written law, and that all
such general principles of common law, being a part of in-
ternal law, are applicable to international affairs.
41
While a strong proponent for the use of analogy in the
development of international law, Lauterpacht has clearly recog-
nized the limitations of this technique. He has pointed out the
pitfalls of giving a provincial concern to the principles of a single
legal system as well as the untenability of any invariable assump-
tion that international relations have their analogies to private
law in every case.42 Having so recognized these limitations,
Lauterpacht has nevertheless cited many concrete instances where
useful concepts have been incorporated into international law by
way of analogy, as has been the case in relation to such matters
as prescription, res judicata, moratory interest, culpability, estop-
pel, finality of awards, the self-determination of a tribunal's
competence, and the proper measure of damages in cases involving
a loss of prospective profits.
43
In direct contrast to the utilization made of general principles
of law, it must be noted that, to this date, the International Court
41 Ibid., pp. 69-70. See also Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law Applied by
International Courts and Tribunals (Stevens & Sons, Ltd., London, 1953).
42 Ibid., pp. 84-6.
43 Svarlien, An Introduction to the Law of Nations (McGraw-Hill Co., New York,
1955), pp. 149-52, also provides a number of illustrations with respect to the proper
measure of damages.
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of Justice, or for that matter its predecessor also, has never made
use of the power given it, subject to the consent of the parties,
to decide a case ex aequo et bono, although some cases may have
come close to resolution on this basis.
44
6. PRIORITY AMONG THE SOURCES
The enumeration of the sources of law to be applied by the
International Court of Justice contains within itself no precise
statement of priority among the various sources. The Statute
does indicate that the role of judicial decisions is regarded as a
"subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law," ' 45
which would seem to imply a repudiation of the rule of stare
decisis in the area of international law. In the S. S. Wimbledon
Case,48 involving the right of entrance to the Kiel Canal, the
Permanent Court of International Justice did rule that treaties
took priority over customary law, but this was a necessitous
decision for otherwise treaties would not serve to change cus-
tomary international law, hence there never would be a change
until a new custom arose to replace the old one. It is perhaps an
interesting paradox that almost the reverse situation prevails in
the English courts. These courts recognize that customary inter-
national law will serve to override the common law or English
statutory law, but treaties will not be given that effect unless they
have been re-enforced by enabling legislation enacted by Parlia-
ment.
4 1
In the United States, on the other hand, it is clear that far
greater effect will be given to judicial decisions than is suggested
by the characterization of them as being only a "subsidiary
means" to the achievement of a determination .4  To the extent,
44 See, for example, the Free Zones Case, PCIJ Order, Dec. 6, 1930, ser. A, no. 24.
45 Art. 38, Statute of International Court of Justice.
46 PCIJ Publications, ser. A, no. 1; Hudson, Cases (1936), 474.
47 Black., Comm., IV, *67, notes that, in England, "the law of nations (whenever
any question arises which is properly the object of its jurisdiction) is here adopted
in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the
land."
48 The publication of Hambro, The Case Law of the International Court (Sijthoff,
Leyden, 1952), is suggestive evidence that, even among the continental-law scholars,
more weight is increasingly being paid to case decisions in the development of
International law.
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therefore, that the existence of a degree of priority among the
sources of law may be deemed important to the resolution of some
particular controversy, it is likely that an American tribunal
would pay the highest regard first to the provisions of treaty law,
subject of course to the limitations of judicial construction; pro-
ceeding secondly to judicial decisions, including general principles
of law and analogies insofar as they are not embraced in the
former; and would give credence last of all to the general opinions
of jurists.
